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Vertical integration for full outsourcing: 
Growth and internationalization of a Portuguese packaging firm 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Based on a case study of a Portuguese packaging firm, this paper 
examines how vertical integration of the supplier serves as a vehicle for 
the full outsourcing of the client firms' needs in a solution that reduces 
transaction costs, favors specialization, and permits small and medium-
sized firms to develop competencies that may be exploited in a wide array 
of projects. Vertical integration by the supplier (a governance decision) is 
a strategic response to changes in the sourcing model of the clients. 
Client-supplier relationships have inter-spatial and inter-temporal value 
that surpasses spot market exchanges. 
 
Keywords: strategic outsourcing, vertical integration, internationalization, 
case study 
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INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of firms are outsourcing the majority of their traditional 
activities to focus internally on only a few. For example, NIKE, Inc., focuses on 
pre- and post-production, and outsources 100% of its shoe manufacture (Quinn & 
Hilmer, 1995). In fact, according to Corbett & Associates (1999), outsourcing has 
risen 18% across industries in 1999-2000. The rise in industrial outsourcing is 
further remarkable when looking at the US food metal packaging industry which 
was dominated by self-production of the producers of final goods (54%) in 1985, 
but by 1996, the US metal packaging industry was dominated by two 
multinational enterprises (MNEs): Silgan Container (39%) and Crown Cork & Seal 
(30%), with a joint market share of 69% (source: The Canmaker, July 1997). In 
industries such as the auto industry, supply chains are being redesigned. For 
example, automobile assemblers no longer have equity stakes in joint ventures 
that supply components specific to their auto models but instead outsource to 
independent suppliers the manufacture of a variety of components (Hennart, 
1988). Outsourcing relationships seem increasingly based on stable network 
models of inter-firm relationships, rather than on arm's length exchanges that 
facilitate inter-firm sharing of proprietary knowledge, and the development of 
new product offerings, and benefits the firms involved (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000).  
Sourcing models, or client-suppliers relations, have been extensively 
researched within the realms of strategic management literature. The typical 
vertical integration, which achieved its height in Ford Motor Co. River Rouge 
complex, has been gradually replaced by flexible organizational formats (Buckley 
& Casson, 1998) that promote the specialization of the partner firms. Recognizing 
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hybrid models to organizing transactions, management scholars now focus on 
cooperative relationships (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Williamson, 1985). Under 
certain situations, cooperative relationships can increase joint efficiency, foster 
innovation, allow the partners to concentrate on their core capabilities (Prahalad 
& Hamel, 1990; Hamel, 1991), reduce firms' investment in specialized assets, 
and mitigate transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). Sourcing models seem to be 
idiosyncratic to, and contingent on, inter-temporal and inter-spatial relationships 
client-supplier. Sourcing models depend on factors such as the focal firm's 
resources (Barney, 1991), dynamic capabilities (Teece et al, 1997), technological 
change (Afuah, 2001) and uncertainty (Teece, 1992), learning intent (Powell, 
1998), supply-side uncertainties (Harrigan, 1985), the ability to appropriate the 
returns from research and development (Teece, 1992), and the characteristics of 
the transactions (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1991). Both client and supplier 
firms seem to have interest in stabilizing the relationship and create trust to 
override potential opportunistic behaviors (Gulati, 1995; Granovetter, 1985). In 
sum, firms' sourcing decisions are contingent upon a myriad of factors that lead 
to hierarchical, hybrid, or market-based governance forms of activities up and 
down the product value chain.  
In this paper, we suggest that the traditional analysis of benefits and 
hazards of vertical integration and outsourcing per se using a transaction costs 
perspective is insufficient. From a dynamic perspective, we argue that vertical 
integration by the supplier (i.e., governance model decision) may be a strategic 
response to changes in the sourcing model of the client industries (sourcing 
model). We support our analysis on the case study of a medium-sized Portuguese 
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metallic packaging manufacturer, COLEP. We observe that governance decisions 
can neither be exclusively based on the benefits and hazards of each 
organizational form, nor on the economics of the product and inter-firm 
transactions. The supplier's governance decisions need to consider the co-
evolution of the client firm and its environment, as well as the potential to 
generate firm-specific advantages (e.g. skills, knowledge, capabilities) that may 
be exploited beyond traditional national boundaries. Echoing Osegowitsch and 
Madhok (2003), we conclude that vertical integration strategies are far from 
dead, and rather contemporary vertical integration is driven by learning 
objectives, the development of capabilities that may be exploited in multiple 
markets and projects, and the need to adapt to new sourcing paradigms of the 
client firms. 
LITERATURE AND CASE STUDY 
In the next sections we integrate research on vertical integration, 
transaction cost theory, and models of strategic outsourcing with the analysis of 
the case study of COLEP.  
The process of collecting firm-specific information involved two main 
sources: (a) primary sources through open-ended, unstructured and 
conversational interviews in the firm followed by visits to the company's facilities; 
(b) secondary sources such as company reports, magazines, promotional 
handouts, previous studies, and personal contacts with industry specialists. The 
data gathering procedure was consistent with Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994) 
on case study research. 
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COLEP, a Portuguese packaging company, was founded in 1965 as a metallic 
packaging manufacturer. COLEP gradually widened its product and activity 
portfolio through vertical integration of the packaging value chain. Founded as a 
decorative cans producer for industrial products, COLEP integrated lithography (in 
1970), the production of aerosol containers (1972), the manufacture of plastic 
components (1973), contract filling of aerosol cans (1975), production of plastic 
containers (1982), contract filling of liquids (1983), and, in 1984, the production 
of metallic containers for food products (source: company reports). These 
activities comprise the entire value chain of selected product segments. Thus, 
vertical integration allows COLEP to offer a full service that corresponds to the 
(full) outsourcing1 needs of selected products and activities of client firms. In 
1975, COLEP established a partnership with the multinational Johnson Wax (JW), 
and, in 1993, acquired Johnson Wax's Spanish contract-filling subsidiary in 
Valdemoro. More recently, COLEP advanced its internationalization strategy with 
a greenfield operation in Poland.  
The industry 
The metal packaging industry is very heterogeneous, with significant 
variations in the final product, and where standardization in some segments co-
exists with differentiation in others. In such an industry it is important that firms 
encounter an unique positioning amidst competitors (Caves & Porter, 1977; 
Porter, 1980; Reger & Huff, 1993). COLEP's distinctiveness is built on a high level 
of vertical integration. Although there are numerous manufacturers of metal 
packaging and plastic components, and contract fillers, there is no other firm (at 
                                                 
1 The majority of activities outsourced by COLEP are manufacturing related. 
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least in the EU) that carries in-house such wide array of activities of the 
packaging value chain: from lithography to distribution (Martins, 1996).  
For example, in the metal packaging industry we find small niche players 
such as Ormis, CMB/Colep or Vivancos in the production of containers for a 
narrow market segment (i.e., canned fish goods). Other firms, such as Neorelva, 
A.Freitas and Ferbal are specialists in metal containers for industrial products 
(e.g., paints, varnishes) and manufacture only in one country. Most contract 
fillers such as Fimper are small and do not manufacture the containers. The 
segments of cosmetics, hygiene, and consumer goods are dominated by self-
production of the manufacturers. Finally, MNEs such as Lever, Procter & Gamble, 
Johnson or Gillette tend to focus on R&D, formulation and filling of their products, 
privileging outsourcing of small batches of mature products. It is in the full 
outsourcing of these batches that small to medium enterprises may find a viable 
niche.  
Vertical Integration 
A firm is vertically integrated when it owns or controls the assets in 
successive stages of the value chain. That is, if it has two or more adjacent 
economic activities under its ownership control, and uses the outputs of backward 
stages as inputs in forward stages (Fronmueller & Reed, 1996). There is 
substantial incentive for firms to vertically integrate, as indicated in prior 
literature. The incentive to vertically integrate depends on the type of production 
involved, the extent of transaction costs, the amount of specialized assets, the 
degree of market power at each stage of production, the separability of activities, 
and the amount of uncertainty concerning prices and costs. Costs may be 
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decreased by avoiding market costs (Jones & Hill, 1988), by eliminating the 
distortion in input costs caused by imperfect competition in the upstream market 
(Vernon & Graham, 1971; Westfield, 1981), by reducing transaction costs (Jones 
& Hill, 1988; Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1971), by decreasing uncertainty or 
asymmetric information, resulting in a more efficient use of inputs (Green, 1974; 
Riordan & Sappington, 1987), and by protecting proprietary technology (Jones & 
Hill, 1988).  
In addition, vertical integration strategies benefit firms by reducing or 
eliminating firm's dependence on external agents. Reducing the dependence on 
external agents is particularly important in cartelized markets, and when the 
access to inputs suffers from small numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1985). 
Vertical integration can also increase profits through higher prices by creating 
barriers to entry (Bain, 1956; Salop & Scheffman, 1983), allowing price 
discrimination (Perry, 1980; Stigler, 1951), reducing service and advertising 
externalities (Jones & Hill, 1988; Perry & Groff, 1985), or providing a firm with 
power over buyers or suppliers (Porter, 1980). 
The benefits for the firm accrue as higher efficiency through the control of 
the value chain (Reeve, 1990), higher flexibility (Richardson, 1996), and ability to 
increase the value added of the products manufactured. This is more likely to 
occur in highly regulated industries, unstable environments, or/and as a result of 
the nature of the product and of the manufacturing technologies (Madhok & 
Tallman, 1998).  
Although the benefits of vertical integration, namely in permitting firms to 
overcome many imperfections in the market for intermediate inputs (Hennart, 
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1982; Rugman, 1981; Afuah, 2001), have been recognized by transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1985), vertical integration is a "two-edged" sword 
(Afuah, 2001). This has been evidenced by the mixed empirical results on the 
performance implications of vertical integration. Vertical integration may not be a 
superior organizational form in unstable environments because it creates rigidities 
(Teece, 1992), competency traps (Levinthal & March, 1993), administrative 
burdens (Williamson, 1985), and increase firms' likelihood of failure in the 
presence of technological changes (Afuah, 2001).  
The disadvantages of vertical integration emerge, essentially, from the 
insulation of the firm. First, the firm looking inward may be limited to local search 
behaviors (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) and fail to capture market changes 
(Richardson, 1996) that occur beyond its immediate landscape (Levinthal, 1997; 
March, 1991). Second, the management of a vertically integrated firm is more 
complex, and may result in administrative inefficiencies, and possibly higher 
production costs (Mahoney, 1992). Third, firms benefit more from vertical 
integration the smaller are differences among the minimum efficient scales of the 
stages of production integrated and the scale of operation of the firm (Casson & 
Associates, 1986). At the outset, the firm should only focus on those activities 
that contribute to achieve its objectives, and that are supported by the firm's 
capabilities (Hamel, 1991; Teece et al., 1997) or firm-specific knowledge (Grant, 
1996).  
In the metal packaging industry, and particularly in the case of Colep, we 
observe interesting features of the benefits of vertical integration worth 
revealing. COLEP's vertical integration is a response to both its clients' needs, and 
 - 11 - 
its internal efficiency requirements. The clients seek partners to whom they might 
outsource the entire value chain of selected products (generally small to medium 
batches of uniform products, or products in which they have a competitive 
disadvantage). Internally, vertical integration permits COLEP to increase the 
products' value added, and to overcome market imperfections in inputs (e.g. 
lithography). For example, although manufacturing of metallic containers is 
COLEP's traditional business, COLEP has been shifting its strategy to concentrate 
on the contract-filling segment (roughly 40% of the revenues in 1996) and 
aerosols, which are higher value added segments. The success of this strategy is 
evident in the increased sales from 15 million dollars in 1985 to 90 millions in 
1998 (an annual average increase of 33%). In addition, foreign business 
accounts for an increased share of the revenue from 17% in 1985 to about 55% 
in 1998.  
Transaction Costs  
Transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985) is frequently used to assess the 
relative merits of vertical integration vis a vis other governance models. 
Transaction costs suggests that the choice of governance model depends on the 
assessment of uncertainty relating inputs, frequency of exchanges between client 
and supplier, and asset specificity (Williamson, 1985; Afuah, 2001). In addition, 
transaction costs theory relies on two basic assumptions on human nature: 
bounded rationality and opportunism (Barney & Hesterly, 1996). According to the 
transaction cost theory, firms benefit from vertical integration if this solution 
reduces transaction and production costs; if it prevents the hazards from 
bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviors of partners, unequal bargaining 
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power of the partners, and reduces the search and contract costs associated to 
future transactions.  
Transaction costs supported by COLEP's clients are lessened for a variety of 
reasons. First, the risk of opportunistic behaviors by COLEP is low. Even 
considering that COLEP has access to the chemical formula of the contract filling 
products, possible opportunistic behaviors could only provide short-term gains 
because COLEP's reputation would be damaged (Gulati, 1998) if, for example, it 
breached a contract. Furthermore, the risk of opportunistic behaviors is reduced 
because the clients outsource the production of mature products, where 
competitive advantage no longer relies on the exclusive control of know how 
(Vernon, 1966). In fact, COLEP has maintained some ties for more than thirty 
years, which reflects its ability to create stable, durable, and trusting 
relationships (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Granovetter, 1985) that reduce 
transaction costs when the exchange frequency is high and the client made some 
commitment (Ghemawat, 1991) to the relationship.  
Second, transaction costs are reduced because the assets are not specific to 
the transaction. Williamson (1985) argued that hierarchical governance is the 
most efficient structure when the transactions are recurrent and the investments 
are specific to the transaction. COLEP's assets are easily redeployed to any client 
or product with minimal adjustments. Therefore, COLEP has alternative uses for 
its assets without a significant loss of value or productivity. In fact, COLEP works 
within polygamous relations (Jones et al, 1997) and supplies several competing 
firms from which it accesses proprietary knowledge. On the other hand, clients do 
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not make irreversible commitments to the relation because their assets (i.e., 
knowledge) may be adjusted to other suppliers (Bensaou & Anderson, 1999). 
Third, COLEP is able to reduce transportation costs by vertically integrating. 
How is this done? It has actually to do with the economics of the packaging. The 
costs accruing from the transportation of containers to the customer are the main 
barrier to the international expansion of the metallic packaging producers. 
Packaging seems to be immobile to long distance transportation. However, this 
problem may be mitigated by either transporting a higher value added product 
(for which vertical integration of adjacent value activities is a solution) or 
minimizing geographic distance to the client. Only products with high value 
added, such as full aerosols, are mobile to distant markets: UK, France, Poland, 
Russia, and the US.  
Strategic Outsourcing 
Firms worldwide are challenged to reconsider their organizational forms and 
competitive landscape (Schendel, 1995) due to the deregulation of markets, rapid 
technological change, and reduction of transaction costs emerging from the new 
communication technologies (Dunning, 1995; Combs & Metcalfe, 2000). To these 
trends firms respond by increasing disaggregation of the value chain (Zenger & 
Hesterly, 1998) and creating novel relational models based on strategic 
outsourcing schemas (Gulati, 1998; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). These responses 
help firms focus on their knowledge base (Grant, 1996) while resorting to 
external agents (i.e., suppliers) for specialized skills (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), 
and using governance models that favor flexibility and responsiveness to market 
changes (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
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Models of strategic outsourcing tend to be based on stable collaborative 
relationships with a few (eventually only one) selected suppliers. Instead of 
relying on multiple suppliers and being subject to potentially opportunistic short-
term behaviors (Williamson, 1985), the client firm is tied to one supplier with 
whom it shares know-how, information, and interdependence. Thus, strategic 
outsourcing is not based on arm's length relationships, where the client has 
bargaining power over the supplier, but rather on relational capital with 
entrusted, selected, and supportive suppliers (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Uzzi, 
1996). The outcome is that firms internalize only the activities in which they have 
a competitive advantage, and that are of strategic importance (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994; Teece, 1992), or activities that are critical 
sources of vulnerability (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). Conversely, firms externalize (or 
contract in the market) to outside firms productions that are not strategically 
important, where they do possess a competitive advantage, and where suppliers 
are efficient. In the case of metallic container manufacturing, the control of the 
production process is not critical and does not seem to provide the client a 
competitive advantage. In addition, in the case of COLEP, a stable model of 
outsourcing seems warranted because the clients (particularly MNEs) need to 
transfer some proprietary knowledge (e.g. chemical formulas) for the contract 
filling operations. Finally, because there are other potential suppliers of the 
containers besides COLEP, the outsourcing of packaging does not entail a 
vulnerability, or a disadvantageous bargaining position. 
However, effective outsourcing is not outsourcing as much as possible; 
effective outsourcing is about achieving the very best long-term risk-adjusted 
 - 15 - 
rate of return. The costs of outsourcing stem from searching, contracting, 
monitoring, enforcing contracts, and the hazards of outsourcing emerge primarily 
from opportunistic behaviors of the outsourced suppliers (Williamson, 1985). The 
risks of these sourcing strategies materialize in potential hold-up costs gestated 
by the outsourcing regimes (Williamson, 1985) and their instability. For example, 
a recent report by Dun & Bradstreet (Ozanne, 2000) notes that more than 20% 
of the outsourcing relationships fail within two years, and 50% within five. 
However, models of strategic outsourcing entail resilience of the relationship 
client-supplier that is seemingly at odds with standard economic rationale of self-
interest seeking behavior by clients and suppliers (see Uzzi, 1996). Thus, 
strategic outsourcing relies on the expectation of a repeated game in an 
embedded cooperative relationship, where one might expect cooperation to 
persist when self-interest is between achieved through cooperation (Uzzi, 1996). 
Several of COLEP's relationships with clients have been lasting for the last thirty 
years, which in itself is an evidence that the returns from the cooperation are 
high. 
In sum, strategic outsourcing is an intermediate degree of externalization of 
production (or other activities) that the firm is not able, is not efficient, or does 
not want to carry in-house, but where pure off-the-shelf recruiting might involve 
risks of strategic nature, or superior costs. In other words, strategic outsourcing 
involves shifting activities from within the internal boundary of the firm to trusted 
external agents in a long-term orientation that involves exchange of firm-specific 
information and knowledge (Uzzi, 1996).  
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COLEP's Internationalization 
The literature has recognized that the modes of foreign operation tend to 
evolve sequentially from exports to partnerships (e.g., joint ventures, strategic 
alliances), and to foreign direct investment (e.g., greenfield, acquisition of 
incumbent firms) (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990). Alternative explanations for 
firms' internationalization stress internationalization as the mechanism for the 
exploitation and appropriation of returns from innovation (Cagusvil, 1980; 
Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982), as an oligopolistic reaction to competitors' 
strategies (Kindleberger, 1969; Knickerbocker, 1973), product adoption (Vernon, 
1966), or simply a follow the client approach (Li & Guisinger, 1992). Recent 
studies devoted attentions to the internationalization of small and medium-sized 
firms with limited international experience (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). These 
firms do not have slack financial and human resources to single-handedly sustain 
the onus of international expansion, and are more dependent on their network of 
"facilitating" ties than large firms (Ellis, 2000). Oviatt and McDougall (1994) 
argued that the traditional factors that characterized the evolutionary model are 
no longer present (e.g., transportation and communication costs are decreasing), 
which raises the question of what the current factors are that drive firms to 
internalize activities across geographic markets. The more flexible models of the 
MNE (Buckley & Casson, 1998) rely upon the skills and capabilities the focal firm 
may exploit abroad, and the international specialization of the firm. Flexible firms 
require a focus on the core competences (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) and increased 
magnitude and frequency of collaboration with other firms (Contractor & Lorange, 
1988).  
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COLEP's internationalization reflects the internationalization process 
proposed in prior research. It was initially reactive, initiated in the simple supply 
of foreign firms in Portugal, but it evolved through partnerships at home, an 
acquisition abroad, and a greenfield investment. Figure 1 depicts COLEP's gradual 
internationalization process. 
 
FIGURE 1. COLEP's internationalization process 
 
 Countriesa
Portugal 86b
Spain 82 93
France 95
U. Kingdom 86
Angola 91/96{
Poland 97 99r
Russia 97
Saudi Arabia 85/86{
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 - Direct export
 - FDI through joint venture
{ - Turn-key operation
 - FDI with acquisition of 100%
r - FDI Green field
a - Ordered according to psychic distance from Portugal
b - Sold in 1996 after CC&S acquired CMB  
  Source: data collected in interviews. 
 
 
The following sub-sections describe succinctly COLEP's major 
internationalization steps and the characteristics of the entry modes adopted. 
COLEP's internationalization highlights the development of firm-specific 
capabilities, and how the firm is able to exploit its advantages across markets.  
Partnerships at home 
Partnerships in the home market frequently contribute to develop firm's 
capabilities and growth (Root, 1994). Small firms' capabilities are often 
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developed passively through the supply of MNEs in the home market. This was 
the case with COLEP's supply of Shell, British Petroleum, Lever, Johnson Wax, 
Colgate-Palmolive, Mobil, and Reckitt & Colman. However, COLEP's knowledge, 
quality standards, and know-how were originally developed through the supply of 
large national companies such as Carnes Nobre, Victor Guedes, Cin, Robbialac, 
and Petrogal. Several of these partnerships persisted for the last thirty years, 
which is in conflict with the claim that about 50% of the outsourcing partnerships 
do not last beyond five years (Ozanne, 2000). The supply of clients at home 
might be leveraged to supply foreign clients through exports.  
 COLEP's equity joint venture in 1986 with the multinational Carnaud 
MetalBox (CMB), the CMB-COLEP, to manufacture easy-opening metallic cans for 
the Portuguese canned fish industry (e.g. sardines) represented a significant 
move and learning experience for COLEP. Joint ventures are mechanisms for 
learning (Hamel, 1991: Gulati, 1998). The joint venture CMB-COLEP dominated 
the Portuguese domestic market until Crown Cork & Seal took over CMB and 
acquired COLEP's share of the joint venture. CMB-COLEP was also a defensive 
oligopololistic reaction (Knickerbocker, 1973) by COLEP to protect the domestic 
market because CMB already owned six subsidiaries in the neighboring Spanish 
market. 
Turnkey operations 
Vertical integration presupposes firm-specific advantages (or ownership 
advantages - Dunning, 1998) of some kind that is either based on intangible or 
tangible resources (Barney, 1991), or on relational capital (Uzzi, 1996). Through 
the vertical integration of virtually all stages of the package value chain COLEP 
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developed intensive manufacturing and technical knowledge. In addition, the 
stable business relationships with reputable  clients  (some in the oil business) 
provided COLEP with reputation spillovers and made it an attractive partner for 
an array of projects. These two factors, knowledge and reputation, seem to have 
driven two turnkey operations contracts for the oil industry; one for the "Savola 
Company" in Saudi Arabia in 1985-86, and the other for "Van Leer" in Angola in 
1991-96.  
Turnkey operations are another internationalization model used by COLEP 
reflecting the exploitation of the firm's capabilities (March, 1991). The 
construction of metal packaging factories is only feasible for highly reputed firms 
that possess the resources, technological capacity, know-how, and the reputation 
to be a credible partner for large scale projects. In fact, these two turnkey 
contracts originated long-term relationships that extended to the education of 
human resources, and technical and maintenance assistance. 
Acquisition in Spain 
In 1993, COLEP acquired Johnson Wax's Spanish contract filler subsidiary. 
This subsidiary was exclusively a contract filler of mass consumption products, 
and was endowed with technology not yet known to COLEP. The acquisition of 
incumbent firms is a particularly interesting entry strategy when the acquired 
firm possesses superior resources or technology, because in these cases, 
acquisitions are vehicles for learning (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). The 
acquisition of this subsidiary emerged from Johnson Wax's efforts to rationalize 
its European production and concentrate manufacturing activity in Netherlands, 
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and was preceded by COLEP's exports of metallic containers to the Spanish 
market.  
Several reasons lie behind the acquisition in Spain. First, it increased 
COLEP's production capacity in contract filling - the activity that has the highest 
value added. Currently, COLEP's manufacturing capacity surpasses 160 million 
containers, endowing it the largest European contract filler. Second, the 
acquisition brought an inflow of technology and know-how in distribution since 
the Spanish subsidiary had developed a logistics system with its own fleet of 
trucks and multiple distribution platforms in Iberia. Third, the acquisition allowed 
COLEP to exploit scale and scope economies in the production of metallic 
containers, filling, and distribution. Fourth, the acquisition placed COLEP closer to 
major markets (e.g., France, UK), which is particularly important for relatively 
immobile products such as packaging. Finally, it avoided the acquisition of JW's 
subsidiary by a competitor whose rivalry would likely to be felt in the Portuguese 
market as well.  
Greenfield investment in Poland 
Greenfield operations tend to be utilized when the focal firm has some firm-
specific advantage that is best appropriated through internalization, when the 
characteristics of the product or of the host market do not permit service at a 
distance (e.g., exports), or when there is no available target incumbent for an 
acquisition (Root, 1994). Although greenfield investments permit full control over 
the new subsidiary they also entail an irreversible commitment to the host 
market (Root, 1994). Hence, it is not unusual for greenfield investments to be 
preceded by exports to the host country or partnerships with local firms (Root, 
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1994). COLEP had previous direct and indirect exports to Poland prior to the 
greenfield entry. Specifically, COLEP exported selected metallic containers to UK 
contract fillers that re-exported them to Poland already full. Poland is an 
attractive market due to its proximity to other Northern and Eastern Europe 
countries. It represented about 4% of the exports of EU producers in 1994 
(source: SEFEL). Furthermore, investing in Poland meant an opportunity to 
participate in the outburst of the Eastern countries' economic development. 
There are also other external factors that explain the greenfield investment 
in a manufacturing subsidiary in Poland. First is the availability of raw and 
intermediate products of reasonable quality. Second is a favorable labor market 
(both in availability and quality). Third is the prospect for Poland joining the EU, 
which it did in 2005. Besides, transportation costs represent 20% to 25% of the 
total cost in some product lines conferring proximity to clients essential to 
improve firm's competitiveness.  
DISCUSSION & THEORY ADVANCEMENT 
Prior literature has advised firms to concentrate on cost-saving and core-
competence-exploitation when making decisions on vertical integration and 
outsourcing. Based on a case study of COLEP, we argue that such analysis of 
benefits and hazards of vertical integration and outsourcing is insufficient. From a 
dynamic perspective, we posit that vertical integration by the supplier may be a 
strategic response to changes in the sourcing model of the client industries. 
Suppliers may follow a diverse strategy, as in the case of COLEP, to 
accommodate changes in the clients' range of activities (Bensaou & Anderson, 
1999). Thus, vertical integration can be an appropriate strategy for suppliers to 
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tap into the newly open markets emerging from the disaggregation of the MNEs 
activities (Zenger & Hesterly, 1998) in what Dunning (1995) called the age of 
'alliance capitalism'.  
Vertical integration by suppliers may be a strategic choice to respond to the 
growing des-internalization and international specialization of MNEs' activities. 
Through vertical integration suppliers may assume the clients' full product value 
chain activities. COLEP developed a broad array of capabilities that facilitated the 
expansion to foreign markets both through the full supply of its clients and 
through the development of special contracts (e.g. the turnkey operations). The 
internalization of sequential product value chain activities permits fuller utilization 
of unequal minimum efficient scales of the activities internalized with cost 
economies benefits, which are the basis for cost-driven competitive advantages.   
Providing a full service to its clients COLEP approaches an in-sourcing 
solution characterized by stability, trust, and low transaction costs, despite some 
level of asset specificity and significant transfers of knowledge. This model builds 
relational capital despite the "polygamous" character of the relationships (Jones 
et al., 1997). The polygamous character of the relations of COLEP with its clients 
is a distinctive advantage of COLEP and illustrates a model that sustains stable 
relationships client-supplier that contrasts with the occasional outsourcing or 
arm's length exchanges. A set of theoretically-driven propositions may be drawn: 
Proposition 1. Vertical integration can be used as strategic responses to the 
change of a firm’s upstream/downstream business models. 
Proposition 2. Outsourcing can be used strategic responses to the change of a 
firm’s upstream/downstream business models. 
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Firms emerging from small, quasi-first world, countries such as Portugal, are 
pushed to leave the country's political boundaries and search for clients abroad. 
This exit is made easier whenever the firm has some credible form of 
differentiation. Simultaneously, one needs to consider the nature of the product. 
When the nature of the product hinders the service of markets at a distance, such 
as is the case with metallic containers, the firm's internationalization may benefit 
from developing a full service strategy through vertical integration, 
manufacturing of a wide array of products, and focus on the higher value added 
activities. This was COLEP's strategy: to partner for the full outsourcing of its 
clients' needs, which required developing a high level of vertical integration.  
The internationalization path is the result of internal strategies, and external 
constraints and opportunities (Root, 1994). Motives for internationalization vary 
considerably among firms, and frequently path dependent choices or strategies 
impact on the future internationalization of the firm (Root, 1994; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). For example, COLEP's internationalization path was not 
independent of the historical political constraints in the Portuguese market in the 
70's. When in 1975 Johnson Wax sought to enter the Portuguese market the high 
political risk (in 1974 the Portuguese revolution ended 40 years of an autocratic 
regime) hindered Johnson Wax from taking the risk accruing from foreign direct 
investment operations in Portugal. The solution Johnson Wax found was to 
develop a domestic producer through some technology transfer. In addition, 
COLEP's vertical integration seems to reflect substantial supply-side inefficiencies 
in the Portuguese market for intermediate inputs. These inefficiencies stemmed 
from a highly cartelized market. For example, the lithography was concentrated 
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on a few small-sized producers that had low production capacity, insufficient 
quality, and obsolete technology.  
Proposition 3. The resource endowment of a firm’s home country influences the 
firm’s vertical integration decisions in its domestic and international operations.  
Contributions. This case has potential interest for managerial and 
regulation policies. Innovation and development of internal competencies are 
indispensable for the generation of competitive advantages, and these 
competencies may be exploitable in foreign markets. Similar firms need to 
evaluate (a) the level of vertical integration and autonomy for the subsidiaries, 
(b) the management of the client portfolio, and (c) the level of defensive 
investment needed. The former may lead to international alignments customers-
supplier. The value of the relationship customer-vendor surpasses the net present 
benefits of the contracts. The trust (Granovetter, 1985) between client and 
supplier may permit the replication of the relational model in other markets, 
embodying a powerful lever for the internationalization of the firm. It is 
reasonable to assume that this is particularly important for small firms with 
limited international experience. The internationalization of firms from numerous 
industries may be vastly facilitated by the creation of stable relationships with 
MNEs that will help reduce the risks, and costs, associated to the presence in 
foreign markets. Industrial government-led policies may intervene in the creation 
of these ties in the domestic market. 
Out study also offers implications for future academic research. The 
propositions derived from this case study need to be advanced further and 
empirically investigated in a large sample, in order to create knowledge more 
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generable to other firms. [MORE] Given the development of hybrid relationships 
between markets and hierarchies, it is also interesting to study the degree of 
stability of the relationships with MNEs through licensing contracts, or other 
governance forms. Finally, the extent to which cooperation in the domestic 
market may be a lever for international expansion warrants additional research. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this study contributes to the broader discussion of where one 
may draw the boundaries of the firm. Specifically, we noted that contemporary 
vertical integration may be examined beyond the traditional transaction costs 
between agents, rather as a manner to develop firm-specific capabilities that can 
be exploited within and outside the traditional national and technological 
boundaries. The choice between in and out sourcing, or any hybrid form emerges 
from the evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of the alternatives, 
including those that result from the appropriation of specific advantages.  
This case study presents evidence that vertical integration permits 
suppliers to develop competencies that encourage new forms of business (e.g. 
turnkey operations) in multiple markets. The model chosen by the focal firm is 
designed with a level of considerable vertical integration that corresponds to the 
full externalization of the clients' manufacturing activities. This is interesting in an 
era of alliance capitalism (Dunning, 1995) and permits even small firms to 
develop differentiated competitive positions in the industry. These positions may 
constitute the basis for firms' survival and growth. 
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